













A Functional Naturalism 
Anthony Nguyen 
 
We assert that Nature operates for the sake of an end, 
and that this end is a good. (Aristotle, PN 455b17) 
 
1. Introduction 
Teleological explanations appeal to a thing’s function or purpose. 
Such explanations are pervasive in ordinary life. Artifacts provide a 
clear-cut example. Why does a watch tell time? Well, of course, that 
is what watches are for!1 Watchmakers build watches with the inten-
tion that they will tell time. Telling time is the function of a watch. A 
watch that tells time performs its function. A watch that fails to tell 
time is deficient, failing to perform its function. 
 So far, so good. There seems to be nothing wrong with 
providing teleological explanations when explaining some behavior 
of (well-made) artifacts. But teleological explanations concerning 
natural phenomena abound within biology as well. And there, the use 
of teleological explanations is much more controversial.  
Unless I explicitly specify otherwise, I will henceforth use 
‘function’ to mean biological function.2 Biological functions are un-
like artefactual functions—like the watch’s function of telling time—
in that they, biological functions, are “intention-free.”3 A human 
heart, for instance, would have the biological function of pumping 
blood even if no one intended it to pump blood.4  
                                                     
1 Of course, this teleological explanation is not the only sort of explanation 
that could be offered in reply to the question at hand. One may also offer a 
mechanistic explanation that describes the causal processes that allows a 
watch to tell time. My point is merely that, in ordinary life, we would—at 
least sometimes—happily accept a teleological explanation. 
2 For helpful introductions to the literature on biological functions, see Be-
dau (1993), Garson (2016), and Wouters (2005). 
3 And as I will soon discuss, biological functions give rise to good effects for 
their possessors. Artefactual functions need not do this. 
4 McShea (2012) has argued that “goal-directedness [or teleology] is a func-
tion of the perceived complexity of the system” (p. 682, my emphasis). One 
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Many accept teleological explanations in biology as provid-
ing insight into the nature of the world.5 But this does not settle what 
the content of a teleological explanation is. In particular, what is the 
content of the explanans (e.g. that the function of the heart is to pump 
blood)? One commonplace view nowadays is that biological teleolo-
gy can be naturalized.  
 Naturalism, as I understand it, is the thesis that “everything 
real is…in principle within the scope of a purely scientific account of 
the world” (Bedau 1991, p. 647). Value-free naturalism is the con-
junction of naturalism and a second thesis, which I will here call ‘val-
ue-free realism’: 
 
Value-free Realism: All scientific facts are purely 
non-evaluative. 
 
According to value-free realism, all scientific facts are either irreduc-
ible and non-evaluative or reducible in terms of purely non-
evaluative terms. Often, value-free naturalists are concerned with the 
appearance of normativity in biological teleology. After all, a thing’s 
function is something that—in some sense—it ought to perform. 
Many value-free naturalists find this unpalatable. For them, natural-
ism requires “a relatively rigid fact/value distinction” (Bedau 1991, 
p. 647). On this view, science concerns facts, not values. The hope is 
that if biological teleology is naturalized, then we can appeal to tel-
eological explanations without thereby appealing to evaluative no-
tions. 
 But value-free naturalism is not the only game in town. In 
contrast to the value-free naturalist, the teleological realist believes 
in genuinely value-laden teleology. Thus the teleological realist will 
accuse the value-free naturalist of identifying something, teleology, 
with something that it is not. For the teleological realist, all biologi-
cal teleology is value-laden teleology and not anything else. The val-
ue-free naturalist, on the other hand, will protest that she is telling us 
what teleology must be. 
 Some might wonder whether there is a genuine debate here. 
As Richard Cameron has aptly remarked, the orthodoxy seems to be 
                                                                                                    
advantage of this view is that it makes teleology naturalistically respectable 
whole avoiding the objection I raise in §2 against the etiological view. But, 
strikingly, this account makes it up to us whether something is teleological. 
For critical discussion of such “mentalism,” see Bedau (1990). Here, I will 
assume the following: Whether or not something has a biological function is 
independent of our cognitive activity.  
5 This statement should perhaps be tempered so as to not offend the tastes of 
scientific antirealists. Scientific antirealists who are also “pro-teleology”—
teleological realists—may accept that teleological explanations play some 
role in our best scientific theories. That is, such antirealists will say that our 
best theories appeal to some teleological explanations. 
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that “biological teleology is either reduced (or eliminated) or depends 
on…a supernatural entity” (2004, p. 73). What could naturalistically 
respectable and yet value-laden teleology be like? But, so I will argue, 
this rampant skepticism is a symptom of dogma. I side with the teleo-
logical realists. I reject value-free realism. I believe that a purely sci-
entific account of the world may appeal to value-laden teleology.  
Teleological realism requires substantial defense. I will pro-
vide two arguments, one negative and one positive. First, I argue that 
popular attempts to naturalize teleology fail because teleology may be 
present even without the presence of natural selection. This should 
trouble the value-free naturalist. Mainstream attempts to analyze tele-
ological talk appeal to natural selection.6 Second, I argue that value-
free realism is false because (a) we frequently appeal to teleological 
explanations in biology and because (b) teleological explanations are 
inherently evaluative in nature. I will conclude with a short discussion 
on how to accept naturalism while denying value-free realism. 
 
2. Teleology Without Natural Selection  
Naturalists who wish to analyze teleological talk in terms of non-
evaluative notions often appeal to natural selection. Such naturalists 
might say that any object has the function of having some property iff 
that property has been naturally selected. For example, the human 
heart has the function of pumping blood because the heart’s pumping 
blood has been naturally selected for. The heart’s pumping blood 
clearly improves a human’s fitness. 
 Mark Bedau, has already, in my view, developed a powerful 
counterexample to this value-free analysis of teleology (1991, p. 654). 
He attacked the sufficiency of such accounts by developing a case in 
which a population of crystals undergoes natural selection in a lifeless 
world where nothing at all has a function.7 In the envisioned world, 
nothing happens for anything else. Without life, there is no teleology.8  
 But the value-free naturalist has the option of revising her 
account so that more than natural selection is necessary for teleology. 
Perhaps, for instance, she will say that any object x has a function of 
exhibiting any feature F iff both (1) F has been naturally selected for 
and (2) x is part of a living thing. Bedau’s lifeless crystal world fails 
                                                     
6 For just one influential naturalistic analysis in this vein, see Millikan (1984, 
p. 28). 
7 Perhaps ironically, Bedau (2010) defends a view of biological life on which 
crystals count as alive. This view, however, is extremely controversial. I will 
assume that crystals are not alive. 
8 It is a common thought that natural selection suffices for teleology. For 
instance, Basl and Sandler conclude that “selection etiologies are sufficient 
for genuine teleological organization” (2013, p. 699) after only a brief dis-
cussion of the claim. 
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to be a counterexample to this account. The crystals are not parts of 
any living system. 
 I do not plan to argue against merely this particular value-free 
analysis of teleology. I intend to argue against all naturalistic analyses 
according to which any object x has the function of exhibiting any 
feature F only if F has been naturally selected for. Henceforth, unless 
I explicitly specify otherwise, the only naturalistic analyses of teleol-
ogy that I am concerned with in this section are analyses on which 
natural selection is necessary for teleology. I will argue that natural 
selection is unnecessary for teleology. There may be teleology even in 
the absence of natural selection. 
 I will proceed by developing a case in which, intuitively, 
there is a biological function that is not selected for. This case is 
unique in that it will actually occur. I do not invoke anything as fan-
tastic as God or Swampman.9 Instead, I invoke (wet) artificial life 
research. Before I present the case, allow me to review the relevant 
recent scientific findings. 
 Organisms are nothing but complex, organized collections of 
physical matter.10 With time, then, there seems to be no reason why 
we could not learn to use non-living molecules in order to build min-
imal chemical lifeforms, which are sometimes called ‘protocells’. 
This bottom-up approach to artificial life constitutes a significant pro-
ject in synthetic biology (Rasmussen et al. 2004, p. 963). Concerning 
participants at two artificial life workshops that took place in 2003, 
Steen Rasmussen notes that “all workshop participants agreed that 
useful artificial cells [protocells] will be eventually created” (2004, p. 
965).  
And this enthusiasm among synthetic biologists has only in-
tensified in recent years. Craig Venter’s production of a synthetic ge-
nome for the bacterial species Mycoplasma mycoides was an im-
portant achievement in synthetic biology (Venter et al. 2010, p. 963). 
Venter effectively showed that we can create a genome, an essential 
component of all known life, in the laboratory. Even though Venter 
did not create life in the laboratory, his achievement is surely a sign 
of significant progress towards creating life from scratch—from just 
                                                     
9 One might imagine God creating a human out of nothing or a lightning 
strike hitting a tree and causing particles to be rearranged so that a man, 
Swampman, arises from the ashes. For the original Swampman case, see 
Davidson (1987, p. 443). It seems—at least to many—that these cases, while 
perhaps metaphysically possible, are too fantastic to bear much weight. Val-
ue-free naturalists generally “have little patience with purely science-fiction 
counterexamples” (Garson 2016, p. 10). On the other hand, the case I devel-
op in the main text is likely to actually occur.  
10 At the very least, this is true of relatively simple lifeforms like amoebas. 
This is all that is needed for the case that I will develop. For all I will say, 
conscious organisms like humans may be more than merely complex, orga-
nized collections of physical matter. 
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molecules—in the laboratory. Of course, there is much more to an 
organism than a genome. Venter did not create anything close to be-
ing alive. 
But there certainly is reason to be optimistic. For example, 
Rasmussen’s team of synthetic biologists is remarkably close to creat-
ing simple synthetic life (Rasmussen et al. 2016, p. 1). 
 Before describing Rasmussen’s progress towards making 
protocells, however, we need to first understand the operational defi-
nition of life that he is working under. Rasmussen is working under a 
largely uncontroversial operational definition of minimal chemical 
life on which a chemical system is alive if it integrates three function-
al roles: program, metabolism, and container (2016, pp. 1-2). This 
operational definition says nothing about the nature of the matter 
through which these three functional roles are realized. It merely re-
quires that they be realized, or performed.  
The program role requires that information be somehow en-
coded and used to control growth, reproduction, metabolism, and the 
self-maintenance of the container. In a eukaryotic cell, the program 
role is played by the nucleus.11 The metabolism role requires that re-
sources be taken in from the environment in order to fuel growth, re-
production, and self-repair of the system. In a eukaryotic cell, the me-
tabolism role is played by mitochondria. The container role requires 
that some barrier exist in order to protect the internal parts of the sys-
tem, to ensure a reliable influx of resources used in metabolism, and 
to provide a means of releasing waste. In a eukaryotic cell, the con-
tainer roll is played by the cell membrane.   
Importantly, these three functional roles—program, metabo-
lism, and container—support each other. They are three interdepend-
ent functional roles. The successful performance of one role makes 
the performance of the other two roles—if not possible simpliciter—
much easier. 
Rasmussen has achieved significant process towards develop-
ing a protocell that realizes the program, metabolism, and container 
roles. His team has been able to build chemical systems in the labora-
tory with the following properties: 
 
(i) self-assembly of a decanoic acid container; (ii) an-
choring to the container a metabolic ruthenium com-
plex as well as (iii) a conjugated nucleic acid infor-
mation complex; (iv) container feeding and growth; 
(v) metabolically driven container replication; (vi) 
metabolically driven information ligation (part of 
replication); (vii) one-pot metabolic production of 
both amphiphilic molecules and ligated oligomers, 
                                                     
11 I am only considering animal eukaryotic cells here. 
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new information molecules. These are all key mile-
stones towards the construction of a minimal living 
system (2016, p. 2). 
 
Clearly, then, Rasmussen has made significant progress towards mak-
ing synthetic life in the laboratory. He can already build chemical sys-
tems in which the metabolism role, the container role, and most of the 
program role are performed. The only missing piece is self-replication 
of DNA. As he concedes,  
 
One key milestone is not yet reached, however, be-
fore full protocell integration can occur: implementa-
tion of an effective DNA self-replication process 
based on template-directed ligation of two smaller ol-
igomers (2016, p. 2). 
 
So, while Rasmussen has not yet created synthetic life, he is getting 
close.12 There seems to be no reason why, in principle, his project of 
developing life from the bottom-up must fail. After all, we know of 
many lifeforms that are nothing but complex, organized collections of 
physical matter. And there are plenty of synthetic biologists besides 
Rasmussen who are working on creating life. We have all the reason 
to believe that, eventually, synthetic biologists will be able to create 
minimal chemical life in the laboratory. 
What is crucial for my purposes here is this: There is no ques-
tion as to whether synthetic biologists will eventually create life. The 
real question is when. It is highly likely that, at some point in the fu-
ture, synthetic biologists will create minimal chemical life. When that 
happens, synthetic biologists will learn how to create at least one 
form of life from scratch—from its constituent molecules. 
Let us now return to our philosophical aims here. I will now 
develop a case in which there is teleology without natural selection. 
Moreover, this case is not only nomologically possible, but will actu-
ally happen. 
Imagine the first time that synthetic biologists create a chemi-
cal system that uncontroversially and fully realizes the program, me-
tabolism, and container roles. Call this chemical system ‘Eve’. Eve 
satisfies one largely uncontroversial operational definition of life 
among synthetic biologists. Moreover, Eve has parts with functions.13 
                                                     
12 If life is a matter of degree—so that, at least in principle, some things may 
be more alive than others—rather than a binary matter, then we may be justi-
fied in claiming that synthetic biologists have already developed entities that 
enjoy an intermediate status on the “liveliness” scale. 
13 Since the system integrates the program, metabolism, and container roles, 




Eve realizes the program, metabolism, and container roles. So, for 
each of these three functional roles, some part(s) of Eve must perform 
that role. So, some parts of Eve have the function of ensuring that at 
least one of these roles is played.  
For example, consider the part(s) of Eve that realize(s) the 
metabolism role. Call this part (or collection of parts) ‘the metaboliz-
er’. The metabolizer ensures that resources are taken in from the envi-
ronment and used in order to fuel growth, reproduction, and self-
repair. Without the metabolizer, Eve would die. Without being able to 
manipulate resources from the environment, Eve would not be able to 
maintain itself. Analogously, I would die if my digestive system 
failed to process food.14 
The metabolizer’s function is to ensure that metabolism oc-
curs in Eve.15 But Eve is not the product of natural selection. Synthet-
ic biologists built Eve from scratch in the laboratory. Eve had no par-
ents that passed down heritable traits to Eve. So, the case of Eve is 
one in which there is teleology but no natural selection. Therefore, it 
is a counterexample to any naturalistic analysis on which natural se-
lection is necessary for teleology.16  
Moreover, the case of Eve will actually occur. As I outlined 
earlier, there are compelling reasons to believe that synthetic biolo-
gists will, eventually, create minimal chemical lifeforms like Eve. It is 
only a matter of time. Therefore, one cannot soberly object that the 
case is unrealistic. It is eminently realistic.  
A better objection to this proposed counterexample is that 
Eve’s metabolizer has a function merely in virtue of the intentions of 
Eve’s creators. The problem is not that Eve’s metabolism fails to have 
a function. It does have a function. However, this function is ground-
ed in the intentions of the synthetic biologists who create Eve. This is 
not the sort of teleology that is relevant to biology. This sort of teleol-
ogy present in artifacts. A watch, for instance, has the function of tell-
ing time only because its creators intended it to tell time. So, Eve’s 
metabolizer does not have the right sort of function—the biological 
sort of function that the value-free naturalist was concerned with in 
the first place. 
Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that Eve’s metabo-
lizer does have a function—an “artefactual” function—in virtue of the 
                                                     
14 Where p is a part of organism o, the inference from ‘p does something F to 
keep o alive’ to ‘p has the function of F-ing’ is admittedly defeasible. But I 
find it intuitive enough that, by default, we should accept the inference. This 
default, of course, can be overridden. 
15 As is common knowledge among those who have studied biology in high 
school, mitochondria are the powerhouse of a cell! 
16 Holm (2012) and Holm (2013) have also argued that bottom-up synthetic 
biology presents a problem for accounts of teleology that appeal to natural 
selection. But my modal argument involving Eve and Steve, which I develop 
below in the main text, is novel. 
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creative intentions of Eve’s designers. I reply that while Eve’s crea-
tors do intend its metabolizer to ensure metabolism occurs and thus 
gives Eve’s metabolizer an artefactual function, Eve’s metabolizer 
also has a biological function that is independent of the intentions of 
Eve’s creators. Both the metabolizer’s artefactual function and bio-
logical function “aim at” the metabolizer’s ensuring that metabolism 
occurs.  
They are distinct functions. They have differing modal pro-
files.17 To see this, imagine the following case. Alice is an expert syn-
thetic biologist who has made hundreds of living protocells from 
scratch—from mere molecules—in the laboratory. But then Alice hits 
her head one day and consequently forms the false belief that the real-
izers of metabolism and the realizers of program have swapped roles. 
So, Alice now falsely believes, of what in fact plays the metabolism 
role, that it now plays the program role (and vice-versa). For instance, 
if x uses energy so as to fuel growth in a protocell, then Alice might 
believe that x stores information.  But Alice otherwise retains her 
knowledge of how to synthetically build life. She still knows how to 
arrange molecules in such a way so as to create minimal chemical 
life.18 She then synthetically creates a physical duplicate—an exact, 
particle-for-particle clone—of Eve. Call this duplicate ‘Steve’. Ste-
ve’s metabolizer intuitively has the biological function of ensuring 
that metabolism occurs. If Steve did not have a metabolizer, Steve 
would die. But Steve’s metabolizer does not have the artefactual 
function of ensuring that metabolism occurs. After all, Alice did not 
intend Steve’s metabolizer to ensure that metabolism occurs. If any-
thing, Alice intended, of Steve’s metabolizer, that it perform the pro-
gram role.19 Therefore, Steve’s metabolizer has the biological func-
                                                     
17 My argument is inspired by the (in)famous metaphysical argument that a 
statue and its constituent clay are distinct objects, since the clay may exist 
even if the statue does not. For a few defenses of the attendant view of mate-
rial constitution, see Fine (2003), Oderberg (1996), and Wiggins (1968). 
18 This seems clearly possible. I might know how to build a house even if I 
mistakenly believe that doors are for letting light in and windows are for 
allowing people to enter, and leave, a house. I might put together a perfectly 
normal house and intend the doors to function as windows and the windows 
to function as doors. 
19 It is important to note that Alice has a de re intention, of what is in fact 
Steve’s metabolizer, that it performs the program role. This means that, 
whatever the metabolizer actually is, Alice intends, of it, that it perform the 
program role. After all, after Alice hits her head, she begins to believe, of 
whatever actually plays the metabolism role, that it plays the program role. 
Alice may have the de dicto intention that whatever plays the metabolism 
role plays the metabolism role, but this is unproblematic. I only require Al-
ice’s de re intention.  
     To see the distinction between de re and de dicto intentions, consider an-
other case. A philosophy student may have the de dicto intention that her 
conclusion not be a premise, but still have the de re intention, of what is in 
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tion, but not the artefactual function, of ensuring that metabolism oc-
curs.20 
But since Steve is a physical duplicate of Eve, it is eminently 
plausible that Eve could have had all the properties that Steve has.21 
Therefore, Eve’s metabolizer could have had the biological function, 
but not the artefactual function, of ensuring that metabolism occurs. If 
Eve’s biological function and artefactual function of ensuring that 
metabolism occurs were the same function, then there would not be 
any modal differences between these functions.22 But there is a modal 
difference—the biological function could have existed without the 
artefactual function. Therefore, Eve’s metabolizer’s biological and 
artefactual functions of ensuring that metabolism occurs are distinct.  
What is crucial for our purposes here is that Eve’s metaboliz-
er has a biological function—distinct from its artefactual function—
that is independent of the intentions of Eve’s creators. This is plausi-
ble because Steve’s metabolizer has a biological function that is inde-
pendent of the intentions of Steve’s creator, Alice. Even though Alice 
has no intention—of Steve’s metabolizer—that it will ensure that me-
tabolism occurs, Steve’s metabolizer still has the function of ensuring 
that metabolism occurs. And since Eve is a physical duplicate of Ste-
ve, Eve’s parts would have any “intention-free” biological functions 
that Steve’s parts do. So, Eve’s metabolizer has a biological function. 
It may here be objected that I still have failed to show that 
Eve’s metabolizer has a biological function at all. I have only asserted 
that Eve’s metabolizer has a biological function in addition to its arte-
factual function. Why not believe that Eve’s metabolizer only has an 
                                                                                                    
fact her conclusion, that it be a premise. When this happens, we say that the 
student has (unwittingly) made a question-begging argument. 
20 Why not claim that Steve’s metabolizer fails to have the function of ensur-
ing metabolism occurs, but instead functions as if it ensures metabolism oc-
cur? A rock may not have the function of being a chair, but it may function 
as if it is a chair. A relevant difference between the rock and Steve’s metabo-
lizer and the rock, however, is that someone must intend, of the rock itself 
that it function as a chair. On the other hand, Alice—and we may suppose, 
everyone else—never intended, of Steve’s metabolizer, that it ensures that 
metabolism occurs. The rock has something like an artefactual function to 
serve as a chair, whereas Steve’s metabolizer does not have an artefactual 
intention to ensure that metabolism occurs. A second relevant difference is 
that the rock, being inanimate, has no interests in any sense. There is nothing 
that is literally good for it. However, Steve, being alive, does have interests 
in some sense. There are states of affairs—like being in a nutrient-rich envi-
ronment—that are literally good for Steve. Ensuring metabolism is literally 
good for Steve, whereas serving as a chair is not literally good for a rock.  
21 Ignore haecceities like the property of being Steve. Eve could have had all 
the non-haecceitistic properties of Steve. This is all I require.   
22 This is an application of Leibniz’s Law. If x and y have different (modal) 
properties, then x ≠ y. 
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artefactual function—a function somehow grounded in the intentions 
of Eve’s creators?  
I reply that it is ad hoc to insist that this is so. Steve’s me-
tabolizer has a biological function. As Eve is a physical duplicate of 
Steve, Eve is, intuitively, a clone of Steve. So if any of Steve’s parts 
has a biological function, the default assumption should be that the 
corresponding part of Eve has a corresponding biological function.23 
Intuitively, the property of being an organism (Steve) with a part 
(Steve’s metabolizer) with a biological function (ensuring that metab-
olism occurs) is an intrinsic property. I will assume this is so. But 
physical duplicates share all their intrinsic properties. Eve and Steve 
are physical duplicates. If Steve’s metabolizer has the function of en-
suring that metabolism occurs (in Steve), then Eve’s metabolizer has 
the function of ensuring that metabolism occurs (in Eve).  
Moreover, just as Steve’s metabolizer reliably generates good 
effects for Steve by ensuring that metabolism occurs, Eve’s metabo-
lizer reliably generates good effects for Eve by ensuring that metabo-
lism occurs. Steve’s metabolizer helps keep Steve alive, just as Eve’s 
metabolizer helps keep Steve alive. The fact that Steve’s metabolizer, 
a part of Steve, reliably promotes that which is good for Steve pro-
vides us reason to believe that Steve’s metabolizer has a biological 
function.24 Analogously, then, we ought to say that Eve’s metabolizer 
has a biological function on the grounds that Eve’s metabolizer, a part 
of Eve, promotes that which is good for Eve.25   
We also now have the resources to answer a final objection: 
Does Eve’s metabolizer’s playing the metabolizer role really fail to be 
the product of any selection? After all, humans created Eve with the 
intention that its metabolizer play the metabolizer role. These creators 
may be Eve’s parents. And the traits they intended to give Eve (and 
succeeded in giving) may be the traits “inherited” by Eve. As John 
Basl and Ronald Sandler put the idea, artifacts’ “parts were selected 
for, intentionally, because of the roles they play in achieving certain 
ends” (2013, p. 700). But if there is selection in Eve’s case, then Eve 
is no counterexample to the thesis that teleology requires selection.26  
                                                     
23 After all, if my heart has the function of pumping blood, then it is eminent-
ly plausible that my physical duplicate’s heart has the function of pumping 
blood. Just as I would die if my heart failed to pump blood, my physical du-
plicate would die if his heart failed to pump blood. 
24 So as Sandler notes, a “synthesised organism still has a good, and it is still 
a good of its own” (2012, p. 52). 
25 Why, after all, do we say that my heart has the biological function of 
pumping blood? It seems that its being a part of me and its regularly generat-
ing good effects for me are jointly sufficient for its having a function. 
26 Basl (2012) advances this objection. He would be happy to accept that a 
synthetic organism like Eve is not the product of natural selection. Basl de-
nies that “the only aetiologies capable of grounding teleology…are natural 
selection etiologies” (2012, p. 544). But Basl insists that the relevant artefac-
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Even granting this for the sake of argument, Steve is still a 
counterexample. Steve’s metabolizer has the function of playing the 
metabolizer role. But no one intended Steve’s metabolizer to play that 
role. So even on an expansive notion of selection, Steve’s metaboliz-
er’s playing the metabolizer role was not selected for. Therefore, we 
still have a case of teleology without selection.27  
There is good reason to believe that Eve’s or Steve’s metabo-
lizer has a biological function. The only reason I see to deny this is a 
prior theoretical commitment to some value-free analysis of teleolo-
gy.28 But it would be question-begging to appeal to a value-free anal-
ysis of teleology in this way.29  
 
3. The Value Argument 
So, natural selection is not necessary for teleology. Is there any hope 
for any value-free, naturalistic analysis of teleology? Can teleology be 
appropriately naturalized without appealing to natural selection? I 
develop an argument in this section suggesting that the answer to 
these questions is ‘no’. 
 Before I present the argument, we should remind ourselves 
what value-free naturalism amounts to. Value-free naturalism is the 
conjunction of the following two theses: 
 
Naturalism: “[E]verything real is…in principle with-
in the scope of a purely scientific account of the 
world” (Bedau 1991, p. 647). 
 
Value-free Realism: All scientific facts are purely 
non-evaluative.   
 
In particular, I wish to emphasize value-free realism. It implies that 
teleological facts are non-evaluative. So, according to this thesis, an 
                                                                                                    
tual etiologies “involve intentions on the part of the designer/user” (2012, p. 
544).  
27 Therefore, as an anonymous reviewer put the point, appealing to Darwin’s 
(1859) distinction between artificial and natural selection would not help the 
value-free naturalist here. 
28 As an anonymous reviewer pointed out to me, it is hard to reason with 
someone who will bite any bullet. I cannot convince anyone who is so com-
mitted to an etiological view on which teleology is reducible to selection that 
she is eager to say that Eve and Steve’s metabolizers do not have functions. 
But this is not a problem specific to my argument. In the face of any genuine 
counterexample to her view, a dogmatist can always accept an absurd claim. 
29 That is, it would be question-begging to deny that Steve’s or Eve’s metab-
olizer lacks a biological function solely on the grounds that some value-free 
analysis of teleology (that appeals to natural selection) is true. After all, I am 
currently arguing that no such analysis of teleology is true.  
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accurate account of teleology is not concerned with the notion of what 
is good for a thing.  
But we speak of what is good for living things all the time. 
We regularly speak of what is good for our friends and family, our 
pets, our plants, and much more. A balanced diet is good for a grow-
ing child, long walks are good for a dog, and regular sun exposure is 
good for a plant. We even speak of what is good for microscopic or-
ganisms. Aerobic bacteria are bacteria that require oxygen in order to 
survive. An environment rich in oxygen, then, is good for an aerobic 
bacterium. We have a notion of what is good for many—if not all—
living things.30 
Any part of any living system S has the biological function of 
F-ing only if (φ) F-ing is, in and of itself, good for S.31 Call this ‘the 
Teleological Conditional’.32 According to the Teleological Condition-
al, my heart has the function of pumping blood throughout my body 
only if (φ*) pumping blood throughout my body is, in and of itself, 
good for me. So far, so good. My heart has the function of pumping 
blood throughout my body, and pumping blood throughout my body 
is—in and of itself—good for me. 
Further support for the Teleological Conditional derives from 
the observation that nothing has the function to do something that is 
not, on the whole, good for a living thing. Take a human with a com-
promised immune system. Her immune system regularly fails to fight 
off harmful pathogens. But, surely, her immune system does not have 
the function of failing to fight off harmful pathogens. Intuitively, in 
fact, her immune system has the function of fighting off harmful 
pathogens. Her immune system is just failing to perform its function. 
Consider, once more, my heart. Besides pumping blood, an-
other behavior my heart regularly exhibits is that of making lub-dub 
noises. Its making lub-dub noises is, in and of itself, neither good nor 
bad for me. If my heart could pump blood just as well without making 
lub-dub noises, I would be indifferent as to whether or not it makes 
lub-dub noises. As it so happens, my heart’s making lub-dub noises is 
                                                     
30 Bedau similarly argues that “value plays a role in…teleological explana-
tions” (1992b, p. 805). Bedau is the most prominent defender of this view. 
31 This Teleological Conditional bears some similarity to Bedau’s “first 
grade of teleology” (1992b, p. 787). But there are some differences. Bedau, 
for instance, states his first grade of teleology with a biconditional. Ayala 
states something very close to the Teleological Conditional when he tells us 
that a “feature of a system will be teleological…if the feature has utility for 
the system…and if such utility explains the presence of the feature in the 
systems” (1970, p. 13). However, Ayala’s claim is stronger than the Teleo-
logical Conditional. The Teleological Conditional does not require that a 
teleological feature explain its own presence. 
32 The name ‘Teleological Conditional’ is a misnomer since the statement is, 
strictly speaking, a universal generalization, not a conditional. But alas, the 
name ‘Teleological Generalization’ does not roll off the tongue as well. 
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a byproduct of the causal processes that must occur in order for my 
heart to pump blood. But, intuitively, my heart still does not have the 
function of making lub-dub noises. The Teleological Conditional can 
explain why this is so. It is false that making lub-dub noises is, in and 
of itself, good for me. So, the relevant instance of (φ) is false. It is to 
accommodate such cases—in which a thing x has some property as a 
mere byproduct of x’s performing its function—that (φ) appeals to the 
notion of what is good, in and of itself, for a living system. 
Functions, then, are evaluative in nature. They are value-
laden. A thing has a function only if it does something that is good for 
the living system of which it is a part. This seems to be constitutive of 
our very concept of a function. But recall that value-free naturalism is 
committed to value-free realism, the thesis that all scientific facts are 
purely non-evaluative. So, according to value-free naturalism, a pure-
ly scientific account of the world need not appeal to teleology at all. 
But biology is a scientific discipline that often appeals to the concept 
of teleology.33 I conclude that value-free naturalism is false. 
This argument relies on the Teleological Conditional. But per-
haps there is a counterexample to the Teleological Conditional? Sup-
pose that a man is being horrendously tortured and has no chance of 
escaping. Let us grant, for the sake of argument, that his suffering is 
so extreme, that living is not, all-things-considered, good for him.34 
His heart’s pumping blood is thus not good for him. This, after all, 
helps keep the man alive. But his heart intuitively still has the biolog-
ical function of pumping blood. The man’s terrible suffering cannot 
strip his heart of its function. But then we have a case in which some-
thing (the man’s heart) has a function that is not good for the living 
system (the man).35 
 This case may initially seem to spell doom for the Teleologi-
cal Conditional. But the case is no counterexample if the Teleological 
Conditional only appeals to the notion of a pro tanto good, and not an 
all-things-considered good.36 On this understanding of the Teleologi-
cal Conditional, it states the following: Any living system S has the 
                                                     
33 For instance, introductory biology textbooks tell us facts like this: 
“[B]lood delivers nutrients and removes wastes throughout an animal’s 
body. These functions are made possible by the circulatory system” (Camp-
bell and Reece 2005, p. 874, my emphasis).  
34 If it is impossible for death to constitute an all-things-considered good, 
then this case is no counterexample to the Teleological Conditional. Of 
course, I would welcome this result. 
35 Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this seeming counterex-
ample to me. 
36 Bedau, a teleological realist, also claims that the goodness present in tele-
ology is pro tanto, not all-things-considered: “[T]he goodness of Cing im-
plies merely that Cing confers a good, not that Cing is best overall…So the 
value analysis requires, not that Cing confers…the best good, but only that 
Cing confers some good” (Bedau 1992b, p. 791, his emphasis). 
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biological function of F-ing only if (φ) F-ing is, in and of itself, a (pro 
tanto) good for S. Importantly, pro tanto goods need not be all-things-
considered goods. In the case of the tortured man, his heart’s pumping 
blood is a pro tanto good, but not an all-things-considered good. Be-
ing alive is a substantial (pro tanto) good for an organism, but the tor-
tured man is in an unusually gruesome circumstance in which death is 
his all-things-considered good. 
 At this point, a different objection may be raised: The notion 
of what is good for an organism is mysterious or arbitrary. Basl and 
Sandler suggest something like this objection:37 
 
Still, in order to make the case that non-sentient or-
ganisms have a good of their own, an account of what 
grounds their good needs to be provided…If there is 
no explanation, then any assertions about what is 
good or bad for them are arbitrary (Basl and Sandler 
2013, p. 698). 
 
 This objection, however, attacks a strawman. The teleological 
realist’s position is not that facts about what is good for an organism 
are ungrounded. Some teleological realists may make this further 
leap, but it is not a necessary doctrine of teleological realism. What is 
central to teleological realism is only that the notion of biological 
function is to be understood in terms of what is good for an organism. 
Teleological realism, then, constitutes a value-first approach to tele-
ology. Teleological realists can disagree about what grounds facts 
about what is good, or even whether such facts are grounded at all. A 
lengthy investigation into what the best version of teleological real-
ism, however, is simply outside the scope of this paper. Thankfully, 
the burden of proof is on the value-free naturalist to show that any 
possible version of teleological realism is committed to the claim that 
facts about what is good for an organism are arbitrary. 
 But perhaps the value-free naturalist is instead asking for 
some guidance as to what the good of an organism is.38 This is not a 
demand for an analysis, but a demand for some grasp of the notion. 
This is a fair demand. We can talk about something even if we do not 
have an analysis of it just yet.39 But we are in luck in the case of tele-
ology. The following remarks by Bedau give us some grasp of the 
notion of goodness relevant here: 
 
                                                     
37 Just to be clear, Basl and Sandler (2013) do not explicitly raise this objec-
tion against teleological realism in particular.  
38 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me to clarify the notion of 
an organism’s good. 
39 For a discussion of why it is unproblematic for the teleological realist if 
the notion of goodness is vague, see Bedau (1992b, pp. 792-793). 
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[T]he theory of teleology appeals not to specifically 
ethical values but to goodness—the idea that certain 
entities have interests (independently of any interests 
of third-parties) that are prompted by certain kinds of 
states of affairs. For the plant, water is not right or 
just or fair but simply good; it makes it better off. Bi-
ological teleology might presuppose that circum-
stances can make plants more or less healthy and can 
affect the degree to which they flourish, but it is not 
so controversial that these matters are matters of fact 
discoverable by empirically investigating the natural 
world (Bedau 1992a, p. 47). 
 
What is good for an organism furthers its interests.40 It is in a plant’s 
interests that it receive enough sunlight to survive; it is not in a plant’s 
interests to die from dehydration. Any substantially deeper explana-
tion of what is good for an organism will no longer be neutral be-
tween differing views (available to teleological realists) of what is 
good for an organism.41  
 We should acknowledge that the interests of organisms may 
conflict. For example, reproduction and survival may conflict. Some-
times, reproduction wins out. In semelparous species (species where 
reproduction occurs once and is followed by death), the cause of 
death is extremely high levels of glucocorticoids (Romero and Butler 
2007, p. 93). Such species produce high levels of glucocorticoids dur-
ing mating in order to catabolize—or break down—proteins. Presum-
ably, this helps semelparous species to sustain the mating effort 
(Oakwood et al. 2001, p. 407). Glucocorticoids are produced in the 
organism’s adrenal cortexes (Romero and Butler 2007, p. 91). Then it 
seems that one of the functions of adrenal cortexes in semelparous 
species is to produce lethally high levels of glucocorticoids during 
mating. This is still in the interests of the organism. If it helps, recall 
that our teleological account merely appeals to pro tanto good. Pro-
ducing extremely high levels of glucocorticoids can constitute a pro 
tanto good, as this helps the organism reproduce. Enhanced ability to 
reproduce constitutes a pro tanto good. But perhaps this is not an all-
                                                     
40 Regan (1976, p. 487) carefully distinguished between having an interest in 
something and taking an interest in something. The latter requires a mind, 
whereas the former—so I claim—does not. A plant can have an interest in 
sunlight even if it does not take an interest in sunlight. It is in a plant’s inter-
ests that it receive enough sunlight, but plants plausibly do not have minds. 
41 Some value-free naturalists, like Basl and Sandler (2013), may be tempted 
to analyze facts about what is good for an organism in terms of facts about 
selection. But given my arguments in §2, this strategy is incompatible with 
teleological realism. Biological functions are not to be understood in terms 
of selection. But given teleological realism, biological functions are to be 
understood in terms of an organism’s good. 
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things-considered good for the organism, as such high levels of glu-
cocorticoids are lethal. No matter: This is compatible with the teleo-
logical realist’s position. 
Let us return to my argument, which I call ‘the Value Argu-
ment’, against value-free naturalism. Just to be explicit, it is as fol-
lows:42 
 
1. There is at least one biological fact stating, of some part1 
of some organism, that it1 has a biological function. 
2. If value-free naturalism is true, then no biological fact 
states, of something2, that it2 has an evaluative property.43 
3. All biological functions are evaluative properties.44 
4. Therefore, value-free naturalism is false. 
 
The Value Argument is deductively valid.45 If the three premises are 
true, then the conclusion must also be true.  
Premise (1) is plausible because we speak of the biological 
functions of organisms’ parts all the time. It is commonplace to say, 
for instance, that the function of the heart is to pump blood. A philo-
sophical view on which all such talk is erroneous would be prohibi-
tively revisionary in its ambition. Premise (2) is plausible because of 
value-free naturalism’s commitment to value-free realism. Value-free 
realism straightforwardly implies that any biological facts would not 
appeal to any evaluative notions. Premise (3) is true because the Tel-
eological Conditional is true. Recall that the Teleological Conditional 
states that any part of any living system S has the biological function 
of F-ing only if F-ing is, in and of itself, good for S. And I have al-
ready raised reasons to accept the Teleological Conditional. 
 The three premises, then, each seem true. So it seems that we 
are forced to accept the Value Argument’s conclusion, (4). But (4) 
simply states that value-free naturalism is false. 
                                                     
42 Here, I use subscripts in order to make it unambiguous what I use pro-
nouns to refer to. For example, in ‘John and James3 ate cake, but he3 would 
have preferred pie’, the pronoun ‘he’ refers to James, not John. 
43 I intend the de re reading of premise (2), which states that if value-free 
naturalism is true, then there is no biological fact stating that something has a 
property that, as a matter of fact, happens to be an evaluative property.  
44 I assume that biological functions are properties. It is not clear that this is 
strictly speaking correct, but the simplifying assumption that functions are 
properties makes it easy to state this argument. Nothing of substance rests on 
this simplifying assumption. If functions are not properties, premises (2) and 
(3) of the Value Argument need only be slightly reworded. 
45 Cameron (2004) argues for a similar conclusion, but he appeals to strong 
emergence. I wish to remain neutral as to whether strong emergence exists. 
And I can: Perhaps some complex microphysical facts count as evaluative. 
For a vision of a naturalism that can, in principle, accommodate this, see §4.  
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 For the rest of this section, I will consider objections to the 
Value Argument. As premises (1) and (2) are uncontroversial, I will 
consider objections to premise (3), the claim that all biological func-
tions are evaluative in nature. All of the objections I will consider 
propose a value-free analysis of biological teleology in terms of non-
evaluative, naturalistic notions. If any such analysis were true, then 
teleology would, strictly speaking, be nothing above and beyond such 
non-evaluative, naturalistic notions. Hence, no biological functions 
would be evaluative in nature. Premise (3), as well as the Teleological 
Conditional, would be false. 
 The most prominent proposed analyses of teleology in terms 
of non-evaluative notions appeal to natural selection. But, as we have 
already seen in §2, natural selection is not necessary for teleology. 
There can be teleology without natural selection. Therefore, any anal-
ysis on which natural selection is necessary for teleology is false.46 
 Another proposed analysis is that the function of x is to F iff 
both (i) x regularly F’s and (ii) x’s F-ing causally contributes to x’s 
continuing to F.47 On this analysis, the function of the heart is to 
pump blood iff (i*) the heart regularly pumps blood and (ii*) the 
heart’s pumping blood tends to cause the heart to continue pumping 
blood. Indeed, the function of the heart is to pump blood, (i*) the 
heart regularly pumps blood, and (ii*) the heart’s pumping blood 
tends to cause the heart to continue pumping blood. By pumping 
blood, the heart causes some circumstances to arise that allow the 
heart to continue pumping blood. On this view, functions are self-
sustaining. What is wrong with this analysis? 
 Let us give the naturalist the stick. Bedau has developed a 
case in which something (a stick) is in a state (staying pinned to a 
rock) in such a way that causally contributes to its remaining in that 
state:48 
 
[S]omething that is not teleological might neverthe-
less have an etiology like the heart’s. Consider a stick 
floating down a stream which brushes against a rock 
and comes to be pinned there by the backwash it cre-
ates. The stick is creating the backwash because of a 
number of factors, including the flow of the water, 
the shape and mass of the stick, etc., but part of the 
explanation of why it creates the backwash is that the 
stick is pinned in a certain way on the rock by the 
                                                     
46 And it seems right to be skeptical of any “disjunctive” analysis on which 
natural selection plays a role in only one disjunct in the analysans. Why 
would natural selection only sometimes contribute to teleology? 
47 This is Wright’s (1976, p. 39) analysis of biological teleology. I have re-
worded it for simplicity’s sake. 
48 Bedau (1991, p. 648 fn8).attributes the case to Robert Van Gulick. 
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water. Why is it pinned in that way? The stick origi-
nally became pinned there accidentally, and it re-
mained pinned there because that way of being 
pinned is self-perpetuating. Therefore, once pinned, 
part of the explanation for why the stick is creating 
the backwash is that the backwash keeps it pinned 
there and being pinned there causes the backwash. In 
this case, the stick meets the etiological conditions: 
creating the backwash tends to pin the stick on the 
rock and the stick creates the backwash because do-
ing so contributes to pinning it. Clearly, however, the 
stick does not create the backwash in order to keep 
itself pinned on the rock. The stick’s behavior has no 
teleological explanation (Bedau 1991, p. 648). 
 
Both (i**) the stick is regularly pinned to the rock and (ii**) the 
stick’s being pinned to the rock generates a backwash, which keeps 
the stick pinned on the rocks. But, intuitively, the stick does not have 
the function of staying pinned to the rock. This is a counterexample to 
the sufficiency of (i) and (ii) for biological teleology.49 But can the 
value-free naturalist revise her analysis so as to get the result that the 
heart has a function and the stick does not? 
 The value-free naturalist might reply that there is a relevant 
difference between the case of the stick and the case of the heart. The 
stick is not part of a living thing. A human heart is. Intuitively, only 
parts of living things can have biological functions. The naturalist 
may then insist that x has the function to F iff (i) x regularly F’s, (ii) 
x’s F-ing causally contributes to x’s continuing to F, and (iii) x is part 
of a living thing.  
 But this analysis is false. A close variant of Bedau’s stick ex-
ample serves nicely as a counterexample. Imagine that, instead of a 
stick, a branch of a big tree is pinned to the rock and generates a 
backwash that keeps it pinned there. We may suppose that branch 
used to hang above the rock but that, over the course of a few years, 
the branch became so heavy that it fell into the water and became 
                                                     
49 A slight variant of the case is a counterexample to organizational accounts 
of teleology, whereby “self-maintenance is sufficient for teleology” (Holm 
2012, p.  538). Here, “self-maintenance is characterised as a property of sys-
tems that are able to exert a causal influence on their surroundings in order to 
maintain…the boundary conditions required for their own existence” (Holm 
2012, p. 537). Suppose the stick would be destroyed if it were not pinned to 
the rock. So, the stick is a self-maintaining system. But then it seems organi-
zational accounts are committed to the absurd claim that the stick is a teleo-
logical system. But neither the stick nor any of its parts has any biological 
functions. Relatedly, Basl (2012, p. 546, fn 10) points out that Holm’s organ-
izational account is committed to the—in my view, absurd—claim that hur-
ricanes and candle flames count as teleological systems. 
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pinned to the rock. The current is strong enough—and the branch 
long enough—so that, if the branch were not pinned to the rock, the 
branch would be much further down the stream. So, (i***) the branch 
is regularly pinned to the rock, (ii***) the branch is pinned to the rock 
in a way that generates a backwash that keeps the branch pinned to 
the rock, and (iii***) the branch is part of a living thing—the tree. 
But the branch, intuitively, does not have the function of staying 
pinned to the rock. Therefore, we have a counterexample to the suffi-
ciency of (i), (ii), and (iii) for biological teleology. 
 So far, I have considered a few objections to premise (3) of 
the Value Argument, which states that all biological functions are 
evaluative in nature. All of the value-free analyses of teleology I have 
considered here fail. So, what is a value-free naturalist to do?  
She cannot simply assert that (3) is false because value-free 
naturalism is true. This is to blatantly beg the question, since the Val-
ue Argument’s conclusion is that value-free naturalism is false. So, 
the value-free naturalist must provide some independently motivated 
reason to believe that (3) is false. The question is: How is she to do 
this?50 
Admittedly, I have only considered a few analyses here. Isn’t 
it possible that I have simply failed to consider the best analysis that a 
value-free naturalist could conjure up?51  
Indeed, I leave it as an open strategy to the value-free natural-
ist to develop an account on which all biological teleology is under-
stood in purely non-evaluative terms. This, I believe, is the project 
she should pursue. I invite the value-free naturalist to try to develop a 
value-free analysis of biological teleology that avoids the counterex-
amples I have developed so far. If such an account is developed, we 
will just have to continue this familiar philosophical game of counter-
example, revision, counterexample. For what it is worth, I am skepti-
cal that the value-free naturalist can ultimately succeed. I confidently 
believe in the Teleological Conditional: Any part of any living system 
S has the biological function of F-ing only if F-ing is, in and of itself, 
good for S. And if the Teleological Conditional is true, then any ac-
count of teleology must go through evaluative notions. 
Perhaps, however, the value-free naturalist has a more revi-
sionary project in mind. Perhaps she does not wish to analyze our 
                                                     
50 And we must weigh the advantages of accepting any such analysis against 
the intuitive appeal of the Teleological Conditional. The Teleological Condi-
tional supports premise (3) of the Value Argument. The value-free analyses 
we are considering are posed as objections to (3). Accepting such an analysis 
requires rejecting the Teleological Conditional, and this is, in my view, a 
substantial cost to pay. 
51 For critical discussion of “mentalist” analyses of biological teleology by a 
teleological realist, see Bedau (1990). For critical discussion of “systems” 
analyses by a teleological realist, see Bedau (1992a).   
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pretheoretic notion of teleology, but instead wishes to replace it alto-
gether with a notion that is wholly non-evaluative in nature. Such a 
revisionary project would replace our ordinary, everyday notion of 
teleology with a much different one. It would replace an evaluative 
notion with a non-evaluative one. 
To a value-free naturalist advancing such a project, I have 
two things to say. First, she should make it explicit that she is en-
gaged in a revisionary philosophical project. Such a revisionary pro-
ject is much different than a more conservative project. Revisionary 
projects seek to replace our ordinary notions, whereas conservative 
projects seek to better understand our ordinary notions so that we may 
use them more wisely.  
Second, I doubt that the non-evaluative notion that such a 
project comes up with should entirely and always replace our pretheo-
retic notion of biological teleology. This non-evaluative notion is very 
unlikely to be what laymen—or biologists, for that matter—have in 
mind when they attribute functions to parts of organisms. Therefore, 
if we insist that all talk about biological teleology is to always be un-
derstood as talk about this non-evaluative notion, then a significant 
proportion of our beliefs about teleology would turn out to be system-
atically false. After all, does it not seem commonsensical that (I) the 
fact that my heart has the function of pumping blood is, at least partly, 
grounded in (II) the fact that my heart’s pumping blood is (pro tanto) 
good for me? The unwelcome result that large swathes of our ordi-
nary beliefs turn out to be false is a significant cost of any thorough-
going revisionary project. I do not find the cost worth it in this case, 
but I happen to place significant weight on our pretheoretic beliefs 
and intuitions.  
I see no easy way to convince you to weigh the costs and 
benefits of a theory as I do. But if this is the source of our disagree-
ment, then it is important to flag it. A lengthy discussion on philo-
sophical methodology is outside the scope of this paper. I will just 
assume here that, as Saul Kripke puts it, a claim’s “intuitive con-
tent…is very heavy evidence in favor of [it]” (1980, p. 42). 
 
4. Conclusion 
Value-free naturalism is in trouble. Not only have I argued that the 
natural selection is unnecessary for biological teleology, I have also 
argued directly for the falsehood of value-free naturalism. 
 Where does this leave us? Must we forgo all of naturalism? 
Must we welcome back vitalism with open arms? Must we take the 
mystical to be just as real as the physical? Must we posit ghostly enti-
ties that are no longer within the purview of the sciences? 
No. We can salvage naturalism’s claim that everything real 
can be studied by the sciences. We need only to admit of value among 
that which exists in nature. The arguments of this paper pose no prob-
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lem for a more inclusive naturalism that forgoes value-free realism. 
Value-free realism is the source of value-free naturalism’s ills. It is a 
philosophical prejudice that unnecessarily constrains the sciences. It 
is a functionless dogma.  
The biologist J.B.S. Haldane is said to have lamented that 
“[t]eleology is like a mistress to a biologist: he cannot live without 
her but he’s unwilling to be seen with her in public” (Mayr 1988, p. 
63). Let us rectify this situation by making the relationship public. 
Genuinely value-laden teleology is a subject of biology. Naturalists 
should learn to live with this. 
 Bedau paints a clear picture of the sort of naturalism which I 
wish to endorse here:52 
 
These difficulties with naturalistic accounts of bio-
logical teleology arise specifically for the narrow 
naturalism that banishes “transcendent standards of 
value” from nature. But naturalists need not be nar-
row. A broader view of nature, perhaps roughly Aris-
totelian in outlook, could reckon objective standards 
of value as part of the natural order. According to this 
broader form of naturalism, which would contrast 
with supernaturalism and would reject the miraculous 
in nature, values would be real…natural properties, 
subject to broadly scientific investigation. Making 
sense of this broadly construed naturalism might ena-
ble the many attractions of a naturalistic treatment of 
biological teleology to be realized (1991, p. 655).53 
 
If we naturalists release ourselves from the yolk of value-free realism, 
then we may embrace a naturalism that presents a rich view of a 
world chockfull of both the value-free and the teleological.54 This in-
clusive naturalism is the only kind of naturalism we ought to sub-
scribe to. This is a functional naturalism for teleological realists.55 
                                                     
52 Bedau (1991) seems to defend a teleological realism on which value is 
irreducible. While I am sympathetic to this view, I do not wish to commit 
myself to it here. 
53 For one helpful discussion of Aristotle’s views on teleology, see Cameron 
(2010). 
54 One interesting upshot of such a naturalism concerns Teleological Indi-
vidualism, “the view that organisms…are…goal-oriented systems while bio-
logical collectives…are mere assemblages of organisms” (Basl 2017, p. 
1058). Basl (2017) argues that Teleological Individualism is incompatible 
with etiological accounts of teleology. So, it may be good news for Teleolog-
ical Individualism that etiological accounts are false. Proponents of Teleo-
logical Individualism are better off accepting teleological realism. 
55 For helpful discussion on the topic of this paper and for philosophical tute-
lage in general, I wish to thank Mark Bedau. I also wish to thank several 
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